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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATfi OF UTAH

BOWEN TRUCKING, INC., DALBO, INC.,
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC., PHILIP W.
MARTIN AND D. E. CASADA CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
FRANK S. WARNER, OLOF E. ZUNDEL, and
JAMES N. KIMBALL, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and DUANE HALL TRUCKING, INC.,

Case No. 14533

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an original action brought in this court in
which the plaintiffs seek to reverse the order of the Public
Service Commission of Utah, in the Matter of the Application
of defendant Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. to acquire the operating
authority of C & M Service, Inc., as set forth by Contract
Carrier Permit No. 511, Case No. 6257.
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
This case was originally heard on December 12, 1974.
Based upon a Stipulation between counsel, the implication of
which was not explained to Duane Hall, President of Duane Hall
Trucking, Inc., plaintiff withdrew their opposition and on

January 6, 1975 the Public Service Commission issued Permit
No. 557 which contained a restriction to service for and on
behalf of Shell Oil Company only.

(R. 133-134)

Subsequently,

Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. obtained new counsel and on June 13,
1975 filed a Petition for Rehearing.

Various pleadings in

support and opposing the Petition for Rehearing were also
filed.

On August 1, 1975 the Public Service Commission found

that sufficient reason for rehearing had been made to appear
but felt that they lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition
for rehearing due to Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated.
(R. 184)

On August 13, 1975 the Supreme Court of the State of

Utah filed its decision in Case No. 13926, Mary A. Murphy, et
al. vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., reversing
the previous order of the Commission in a Contract Carrier
Permit Transfer proceeding.

On September 9, 1975, defendant

Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed a motion to reopen its proceeding on separate jurisdictional grounds.

(R. 156)

Again, after

various memorandum from both sides, the Commission entered an
Order granting the motion to reopen.

(R. 184-185)

After a

full hearing on the transfer of authority to the applicant of
B & M Service, Inc.'s full authority, the Commission entered an
Order on March 3, 1976 granting to Duane Hall Trucking, Inc.
Contract Carrier Permit No. 557 without the restriction
previously imposed. (R. 218-220)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the Report and Order of
March 3, 1976 affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts is itiis-leading and
inaccurate.

It omits to include a number of very material

and uncontroverted facts.

For this reason, the defendant

desires to make its own Statement of Facts covering the facts
that are relevant and material to the issues in this appeal.
On September 18, 1974 Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed
an application to acquire the full operating authority of
B & M Service, Inc. with no restrictions 6r changes in the
authority.

(R. 110-118)

January 6, 1975.

The hearing on this matter was held

The applicant was represented in this hearing

by Mark K. Boyle, Esquire, who was also the attorney for B & M
Service, Inc.

In his uncontroverted affidavit, Duane Hall,

the President of applicant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., set
forth the factual background of the alleged stipulation which
centered around limiting the application for authority to perform
services for one shipper (Shell Oil Company) only.

(R. 138)

On the morning of the hearing Mr. Boyle discussed the
proposed stipulation with Mr. and Mrs. Hall.

They both objected

to the stipulation, stating that they could not accept anything
less than the transfer of the full authority of B & M Service, Inc.
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Duane Hall never conceded to a stipulation for less
than the full authority in Mr. Boyle's office, at the hearing,
or at any time. At the hearing Mr. Boyle apparently agreed
to the stipulation, contrary to the instructions of Duane Hall.
When Duane Hall received the written order with the limitation
of authority he contacted his Vernal attorney, John Beaslin.
Mr. Beaslin failed to inform Duane Hall of the twenty day
limitation for petition for rehearing.

On Januciry 28, 1975,

Duane Hall came to Salt Lake City to discuss the limitation of
authority with Mr. Boyle.

Mr. Boyle advised him that he was

two days too late to file a Petition for Rehearing.

Duane Hall

then contacted Ronald E. Casper, Secretary of the Public Service
Commission, where it was decided to order a transcript of the
hearing to determine what the alleged stipulation actually
covered.

(R. 139)

Statements of counsel at the December 11, 1974 hearing
indicate that the alleged stipulation was based on the erroneous
assumption that the ruling of the Commission in the Pickering
case id, was a final ruling, which was not the case.

(R. 6)

Duane Hall was never informed that the Pickering case was on
appeal to the Supreme Court.

(R. 146)

Although Mr. Hall was at

the hearing and personally voiced no objection to the stipulation,
he thought that the stipulation meant they would be restricted
to one type of contract and further thought that when Mr.
Boyle objected to the words "or Shell Oil Company only"
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(R. 5, Lines 13 and 24) that he was protected,

(R. 145)

After Mr. Hall obtained a transcript of the hearing,
he retained Keith E. Sohm, Esquire, to present the facts to
the Commission and ask for a rehearing.

The Petition for Re-

hearing was filed on June 13, 1975 and set forth the facts
listed above. (R. 136)

The thrust of the Petition for Re-

hearing was that Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. should be entitled
to put on evidence and argument to support a transfer of the
full authority which he had previously purchased and that
this opportunity was denied him by a gross misunderstanding
and completely contrary to his desires and his instructions to
his own attorney.

(R. 137)

The five trucking companies who

were competitors of B & M Service, Inc. and now competitors
of Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. filed an objection to the Petition
for Rehearing.

(R. 141)

After numerous pleadings were filed,

on August 1, 1975, the Commission entered its Order denying
the Petition for Rehearing.

It is significant to note the

language of the Order as follows:
"The Commission is of the opinion that sufficient
reason for rehearing has been made to appear.
However Section 54-7-15, UCA, provides that
applications for rehearing must be made prior to
the effective date of the order or decision or
within twenty days thereafter. The application
in the present case was not within said time."
(R. 154)
The Commission then concluded by denying the rehearing on the
limited and technical basis of lack of jurisdiction for a timely
rehearing.
-5-

On August 6, 1975, the Utah Supreme Court filed its
Decision in Mary A. Murphy v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 539 P. 2d 367, clarifying the burden of proof in a
transfer proceeding.

Based upon this ruling, in addition to

the previous pleadings before the Commission, a Motion to
Reopen was filed September 9, 1975, under the jurisdictional
basis of Rule 60 (b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 156)
Again, numerous memorandums were filed by the five trucking
companies opposed to having a hearing on the merits.

(R. 170)

After considering the memorandums of law and the uncontroverted
facts as set forth in the affidavit of Duane Hall concerning
the alleged stipulation made against his will, by his former
attorney, the Commission determined that it did have authority
to reopen the matter and proceed with a full hearing under the
provisions of Rule 60 (b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 60 (b) having its counterpart in Section 21.6 of Rule 21
of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.
185)

(R. 184-

The Commission's Order stated that this was to be done

in order to prevent an "inequity which would result were we to
fail to reopen this matter and hold a further hearing".

(R 185)

After a full hearing on the transfer of the Contract
Carrier Certificate, in which all parties participated, on
March 3, 1976, the Public Service Commission entered its Report
and Order granting the Applicant Duane Hall Trucking Inc.
Contract Carrier Permit No. 557, which was the exact same authority
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which previously was held by B & M Service, Inc. in Permit
No. 511.

(R. 218)

In finding No. 3 of the Report and Order,

the Commission stated that the alleged stipulation of limiting
authority was based upon "the Commission's prior decision in
the Murphy case", which was not correct.

(R. 219) From its

advantaged position of firsthand knowledge of the facts
surrounding the alleged stipulation, the Commission unanimously
recognized the inequality that would result without reopening
the matter and having a full hearing on transferring the full
authority to applicant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ON APPEAL THE FINDINGS AND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ARE
ENDOWED WITH THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS
AND WILL BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THEM.
The rule is well established in Utah that on appeal the
Findings of Fact and Report of the Commission are presumed to
be correct.

This rule is set forth in Utah Gas Service Company

v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P. 2d 530,
as follows:
"When the Commission, in performing its
duties has given consideration to pertinent
facts and has made its findings and decision,
they are endowed with a presumption of validity
and correctness. In accordance with the
recognized prerogatives of the trier of the
facts, on appeal the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to sustaining them; and
the decision will not be reversed Unless when
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the evidence is so viewed, there is no
reasonable basis to support the Commission's
action, so that it thus appears to be
capricious and arbitrary."
Additional cases involving a review of the Public Service
Commission orders being presumed to be correct, include the
following:

Utah Parks Company v. Kent Frost Canyonlands

Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P. 2d 171; Armored Motors Service
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464
P. 2d 582; and Williams vs. Public Service Commission of Utah,
29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P. 2d 34.
This rule of review is based upon the sound reasoning
"that some credit should be indulged in favor of: the findings
of the trial court because of the advantages peculiar to his
position and immediate contact with the trial."

Nokes v.

Continental Mining & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954.
Such findings are presumed to be correct and the burden is upon
the appellant to show that they are in error.

There is nothing

in the record to indicate that the Commission misapplied any
proven fact or made any findings against the weight of the
evidence.

The actions of the Commission in reopening this

matter were based upon its view of the facts and its action
was not arbitrary or capricious.
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POINT II
IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF UNDER RULE
60 (b)(7) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Under the facts as previously related herein, and
presented to the Commission, the Commission was satisfied
that Duane Hall was denied an effective opportunity to
comply with Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, to request
a rehearing within twenty days.

After obtaining new counsel,

and without mention of Rule 60 (b), applicant filed a Motion
for Rehearing.

Obviously impressed with the inequality of

the situation, the Commission denied the Motion for Rehearing,
stating that, "the Commission is of the opinion that
significant reason for rehearing has been made to appear.
However, Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, provides that
application for rehearing must be made prior to the effective
date of the Order or Decision or within twenty days thereafter.
The application in the present case was not made in said time."
(R. 154)

Thus, on the limited grounds of this statute, the

Commission correctly denied the right to a rehearing.

Applicant

chose not to appeal this decision within thirty days as specified
in Section 54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated, because the decision
was correct based on the narrow grounds on which it was
presented and upon the narrow grounds upon which it was decided.
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The question was confined to jurisdiction on the time limit
for rehearing as reflected by the statement of the Commission
in the Order.

Thereafter, applicant petitioned the Commission

for relief under Rule 60 (b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This was a separate remedy based upon the same grounds as the
Motion for Rehearing and additional grounds.

When presented

with an additional jurisdictional basis under which to grant
a full hearing into the matter, and with knowledge of the facts,
the Commission unanimously granted the Order to Reopen.
Respondents agree with plaintiffs1 characterization
of the law that Rule 60 (b)(7) is not a substitute for the
right to appeal.

However, because the question of the applic-

ability of Rule 60 (b)(7) had not been raised in the first
Motion for Rehearing, an appeal would not have resolved the
question which is now before the court, i.e., was there
justification under Rule 60 (b) for reopening the case for
further consideration.

Even if an appeal had been taken,

respondent would still be entitled to pursue his additional
remedy under Rule 60 (b)(7).
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence,
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Surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other"misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time and for reasons (1),(2),(3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall b^ by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action."
It is respondent's position that the fact$ clearly justify
relief under Sub-section (7) which allows relief for "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."
Rule 60 (b)(7) has been construed by the Utah Supreme
Court on several occasions.
aside default judgments.

Most of the cases involve setting

One of the leading cases wherein the
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court invokes Sub-section (7) of the Rule, is Dixon v. Dixon,
121 Utah 259, 240 P. 2d 1211.

In that case the court held

that a formal order signed and entered upon the erroneous
assumption that it conformed to a direction of the court, is
more than a mere inadvertence and can be set aside more than
three months after its entry.

The court in noting that it

would work a "grave injustice to permit the order to stand"
also noted that even in the absence of Rule 60 (b)(7), the
court would have inherent power to set aside the formal order.
This case is somewhat similar to the instant case in that here
there was a mistaken assumption on the part of the Commission
and the original attorneys involved as to the burden of proof
in a transfer proceeding for a contract carrier permit and
the effect of a stipulation.
Another case, the reasoning of which is in point, is
Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114f where the court
set aside a default judgment some eleven months after the date
of judgment.

The only grounds stated was that defendant was

under the mistaken belief that she was fully protected under
a divorce decree ordering her former husband to pay certain
obligations.

The court concluded that Rule 60 (b)(7) was

intended to govern this type of situation, and pointed out the
strong policy of the law to liberally construe the statutes and
rules of procedure in favor of trial on the merits.
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The court

also recognized the latitude of discretion given the trial
court in such matters and stated as follows:
"The Utah decisions relied upon by
plaintiff recognize the firmly established
principle that it is largely within the
discretion of the trial court whether a
default should be relieved, which discretion
will not be disturbed unless there is a patent
abuse thereof."
The reasoning of Ney v. Harrison has application to the present
case in that the Commission does have broad latitude of discretion
in determining to reopen under Rule 60 (b)(7) •
A case not involving Sub-section (7) of Rule 60 (b) but
which strongly sets forth the policy of tl|e law in granting
relief from defaults the reasoning of whic^h is analagous to the
present case is Mayhew v. Standard Gilson^te Co., 14 Utah 2d 52,
376 P. 2d 951.

In that case, the Supreme Court found an abuse

of discretion and reversed the trial court for failing to grant
relief.

In speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Crockett

wrote as follows:
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial
court is endowed with considerable latitude of
discretion in granting or denying such motions.
However, it is also true that the court cannot
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be
generally indulgent toward permitting full
inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be
settled advisedly and in conformity with law
and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly and
irrevocably on a party without a hearing is
obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It is
fundamental in our system of justice that each
party to a controversy should be afforded an
opportunity to present his side of the case.
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For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded
as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate
a default judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear, and timely application is
made to set it aside."
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741
involves a situation where the court refused to set aside a
default judgment*

The case simply stands for the proposition

that the Supreme Court will not reverse a decision of the
trial court unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
Although in this case (which involved an entirely different
fact situation) the Supreme Court refused to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, the court commented that
"Discretion must be exercised in furtherance
of justice and the court will incline toward
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end
that the party may have a hearing."
As to the matter of discretion, the court also stated as follows:
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment
is a creature of equity designed to relieve
against harshness of enforcing a judgment,
which may occur through procedural difficulties,
the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes
which prevent the presentation of a claim or
defense. Equity considers factors which may be
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in
bringing or continuing the action, the hardship in granting or denying relief. Although
an equity court no longer has complete discretion
in granting or denying relief it may exercise
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors
of fairness and public convenience, and this court
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where
an abuse of this discretion is clearly shown."
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It should be pointed out that the order which plaintiffs
are complaining of merely gave respondent defendant the right
to put on his case and attempt to justify his-right to acquire
the complete authority he contracted to purchase.

After being

duly noticed, a hearing into the matter was conducted on
February 5, 1976 at which all five plaintiffs were represented
and took part.

(R. 27)

It was only after a full hearing into

the issues that defendant was awarded his full authority.
The Public Service Commission is charged with "the
prerogative and the responsibility of deciding questions relating
to the regulation of carriers within this state for the purpose
of seeing that the public receives the mosfct efficient and
economical service possible", Utah Parks Co. v. Kent Frost
Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P. 2d 171.

In carrying

out this responsibility the Supreme Court will not question the
wisdom of the decision made by the Commission.

Rather, the

Supreme Court is concerned with whether or not all parties are
treated fairly.

in Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply

Company, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P. 2d 530, the court stated as
follows:
"In proceedings before an administrative
agency what a party is entitled to is to be
treated with fairness: to have the opportunity
to prepare and present his case and his contentions with respect thereo; and to have an
adjudication in conformity with the law; and
the decisions of the Commission will not be
overturned because of irregularities of
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procedure from which there is no substantial
prejudice or adverse effect. The matters
plaintiff complains of are not of any such
consequence. It in fact received notice,
filed its protest and counter-petition; and
was in no way limited or prevented from full
participation in the proceedings."
The plaintiffs cannot claim that they were prejudiced or in
any way prohibited from presenting their side of the issue to
the Commission.

In proceedings before the Public Service

Commission the court has also stated in Armored Motors Service
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P. 2d
582, that:
"What a party is entitled to is a full and
fair opportunity to present his evidence
and contentions on the issues; and to have
an adequate consideration and a correct
determination of them. But if the findings
and order are correct it is not his
prerogative to dictate or to complain about
internal method of procedure by which the
tribunal arrives at its findings and conclusions. "
This opportunity was presented fully to the plaintiffs.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is
patterned after Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Sub-section (7) of the Utah Rule is identical to

Sub-section (6) of the Federal Rule, which provides relief for
"any other reason justifying relief from the opesration of the
judgment."

Under the Federal Rule motions under Sub-sections

(1), (2) and (3) can be made within one year which differs
from the three months limitation under the Utah rule.
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There are

numerous federal cases interpreting Rule 60 (b)(6) of the
Federal Rules.

Some of these case may be of help to the

court here.
The underlying principle of Federal Rule 60 (b)(6) is
explained by Justice Black in the leading case of Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.CT. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266, wherein
the plaintiff was granted relief from a default judgment of
denaturalization after the judgment had been entered for four
years.

There it was stated:
"In simple English the language of the
'other reason'clause, for all reasons except
the five particularly specified, vests power
in courts adequate to enable them to vacate
judgments whenever such action is appropriate
to accomplish justice."

In interpreting the Klapprott and other Federal cases, Moore in
his work on Federal Practice at Section 60.27 (2) sums up the
effect of sub-section (6) as follows:
"Seen in perspective, clause (6) is clearly
a residual clause to cover unforse^n contingencies;
intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in,
what may be termed generally, exceptional situations; and so confined, does not piit the finality of
judgments generally at large."
If there were ever a case where Rule 60 (b)(7) ought and should
be properly invoked, it is this case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, defendants respectfully request the court to
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affirm the judgment and order of the Public Service Commission
of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER

?
Bert' E. Rawlings

C. Reed Brown
Attorneys for Respondent Duane Hall
Trucking, Inc.
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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